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ACCESSION BY THE UNITED STATES TO THE UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION
AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN
ARBITRAL AWARDS
LEONARD V. QUIGLEYt
TiE 1958 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards represents another step in the continuing attempt
by businessmen to achieve a non-judicial solution of their day-to-day disputes.
From the days of the early English "piepowder" courts, where merchants with
the dust of the market still on their feet stepped into a tribunal of merchants
for swift resolution of their disputes, businessmen have preferred arbitration,
a process which they think combines finality of decision with speed, low ex-
pense, and flexibility in the selection of principles and mercantile customs to
be used in solving a problem, over litigation. The needs of the businessmen
are basically these: enforcement of an agreement to submit future disputes to
arbitration-both by ordering a recalcitrant party to arbitrate and by staying
court proceedings instituted in disregard of the agreement-and enforcement
of the award resulting from a voluntary or involuntary submission of an exist-
ing dispute to arbitration. But the history of arbitration is replete with mis-
understanding and opposition from judicial and legislative bodies, and the
present arbitral framework is a myriad of complex problems.
The English common law courts early declared that contracts to submit
future disputes to arbitration were revocable at any time prior to the issuance
of an award. 1 This judicial suspicion of "future dispute" clauses, whether
based on jealousy over an expected "ouster of jurisdiction" of the courts or
based upon a public policy that the decision to submit a dispute to arbitration
should be made at the time it has arisen, was carried over into the common
law of all the American states. 2 While this hostility remains the judicial atti-
tude of most of the states 3 -- and has even been codified by some 4 -several
tMembei, New York Bar.
1. Vynior's Case, 8 Co. 81b, 77 Eng.'Pep. 597 (X.B. - 609).i
2. For surveys of the development of commercial arbitration in Enilid and the
Unfted-States, $ e SayreDezelopment of "Commercial Arbtrdtio;i'Law, 37-YAxE- L.J. 595
(1928), and Jones, History of Commercial Arbilrafio3t in Engl nd -and the Utited "tates:
A Summary View, in Do'mxK, INTERNATIONAL TRADE ARBiTRATIOx 127 (1958) [herein-
after cited as DoME].
3. A survey of state laws is contained in KELLOR, ARnITRATIox IN AcIoN (1941).
For a list of general arbitration statutes in the United States, see 12 ARR. J. (n.s.) 38-44
(1957).
4. E.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 216 (1951).
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states have enacted legislation which rejects the common law in an effort to
afford the businessman the arbitration he has contracted for.5
On the federal level, the drive for arbitration received assistance from the
enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act in 1925.7 This Act provides for the
specific enforcement of arbitration agreements in the federal courts,8 and stay
of litigation instituted in defiance of the arbitration agreement ;9 it authorizes
confirmation of the arbitral award by a federal court of the district in which
the award is rendered.'0 But the number of arbitration agreements to which
this Act applies is limited," and the litigant who desires to enlist the aid of
the Federal Arbitration Act must still satisfy all requirements of federal juris-
diction.'
2
5. The New York Statute, N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT §§ 1448-69, is the prototype. Other
statutes enacted in aid of arbitration: ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1501 to -1511 (1956) ;
CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE §§ 1280-93; CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 52-408 to -424 (1958) ; FLA.
STAT. §§ 57.01-.09 (1957); HAWAII REv. LAWS §§ 188-1 to -15 (1955); LA. REV. STAT.
§§ 9:4201-:4217 (1950) ; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 121, §§ 1-5 (1954) ; MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 251, §§ 1-22 (1932); MIcH. STAT. ANN. §§ 27.2483-.2505 (1943); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 572.01-.07 (1947); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 542:1-:10 (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
2a:24-1 to -11 (1952); OHio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2711:01-:15 (Page 1954); ORE. REv.
STAT. §§ 33.210-.340 (1959); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §8 1-209 (1930); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. §§ 10-3-1 to -3-20 (1956); WAsH. REV. CODE § 7.04.010-.220 (1956); and Wis.
STAT. §§ 298.01-.18 (1957).
7. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1958). Before the enactment of this statute, the federal "common
law" of arbitration was held to be that agreements to submit future disputes to arbitration
were revocable and unenforceable. United States Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petro-
leum Co., 222 Fed. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
8. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1958).
9. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1958).
10. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1958).
11. The act applies only if the arbitral agreement involves "commerce," notwithstand-
ing that the parties are properly in the federal court on some other basis of jurisdiction.
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956) (diversity) ; Zip Mfg. Co.
v. Pep Mfg. Co., 44 F.2d 184 (D. Del. 1930) (patent law). The Act does not apply to con-
tracts of employment of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce, 9 U.S.C. § 1
(1958), but collective bargaining agreements have been held to fall outside the scope of this
exclusionary clause. Local 205, UEW v. General Elec. Co., 233 F.2d 85 (Ist Cir. 1956),
aff'd on other grounds, 353 U.S. 547 (1957).
See Kochery, The Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements in the Federal Courts:
Erie v. Tompkiw, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 74 (1953); Sturges & Murphy, Some Confusing
Matters Relating to Arbitration Under the United States Arbitration Act, 17 LAW &
CONTEmp. PRoB. 580 (1952).
12. The Act does not create federal subject-matter jurisdiction. Therefore, a party
desiring to invoke the Act must also satisfy the jurisdictional amount of $10,000 and allege
either diversity of citizenship or some other basis of federal subject-matter jurisdiction.
Judge Hand summarized the limitations in Krauss Bros. Lumber Co. v. Louis Bossert &
Sons, 62 F.2d 1004, 1006 (2d Cir. 1933) :
The remedy is not even co-extensive with the jurisdiction. For instance, the con-
troversy may arise between citizens of different states and the contract not "involve
commerce." A citizen of New Jersey may enforce arbitration against a citizen of
New York upon a contract which requires him to ship the goods from Newark to
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The businessman doing business in several countries has an additional rea-
son for preferring arbitration to local judicial remedies-the fear of discrimi-
nation against the foreigner, consciously felt in actual bias or unconsciously
exhibited by preference for local principles of law. To avoid this prejudice,
contracting parties have attempted to provide in their agreements that disputes
arising should be settled by arbitration in a specified nation or by a specified
impartial third party. Private organizations such as the American Arbitration
Association and the International Chamber of Commerce have developed effi-
cient arbitral procedures and make their services available to private parties.
But some nations refuse to honor arbitral agreements calling for arbitration
to be held in another country.13 Other nations refuse to enforce the arbitral
agreement if litigation has been instituted in a local court before issuance of a
final award. 14 Further, the fate of foreign awards in the national courts has
been less than encouraging to the merchant who seeks predictability of result.
In some nations, the discrimination against foreign awards takes the root of
requiring a full lawsuit upon the award and its underlying agreement,' 5 few
nations treat foreign awards on a par with domestic awards. Past attempts to
achieve equality of treatment by treaty, whether bilateral or multilateral, have
been less than satisfactory. It is into this context that the United Nations Con-
vention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards has
been introduced. 16
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
The Bilateral Approach 17
The representatives of two nations may attempt to work out their differences
over arbitration. The goal under this approach is a uniform set of procedures
in the courts of both nations equally applicable to foreign and domestic arbitral
agreements and awards. Often the best that can be accomplished, however, is
a declaration of non-discrimination against foreign awards. Since World War
II, the United States has been developing the use of a commercial arbitration
clause in its bilateral Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation.
The arbitration clause in the first such treaty, entered into with China in
1946, provided that an agreement for arbitration would be given full faith and
Manhattan, but not upon one where they are to go from Manhattan, to the Bronx.
Conversely, a citizen of New York may not come to the District Court to enforce
arbitration against another citizen of that state, though the goods must be shipped
across a state line.
13. E.g., Uruguay. 2 SANDERS, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 75 (1960).
14. E.g., Italy. 1 SANDERS, op. cit. supra note 13, at 349.
15. Apparently the Philippine practice, cf. Espego, The Enforcement of American
Awards in the Philippines, 13 ARE. J. (n.s.) 150 (1958).
16. U.N. Doc. No. E/CoNF. 26/9/REv. 1 (1958).
17. For a review of arbitration clauses in recent United States treaties, see Walker,
Commercial Arbitration in United States Treaties, 11 ARB. J. (n.s.) 68 (1956), and
Walker, United States Treaty Policy on Commercial Arbitration, in DomxE 49.
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credit in the courts of either nation, but that an award would be recognized
only in the nation in which it was rendered :18
. In the case of any controversy susceptible of settlement by arbitration,
which involves nationals, corporations or associations of both High Con-
tracting Parties and is covered by a written agreement for arbitration,
such agreement shall be accorded full faith and credit by the courts with-
in the territories of each High Contracting Party, and the award or de-
cision of the arbitrators shall be accorded full faith and credit by the courts
within the territories of the High Contracting Party in which it was ren-
dered, provided the arbitration proceedings were conducted in good faith
and in conformity with the agreement for arbitration.
In the next two treaties, with Italy 1 9 in 1948 and Uruguay 20 in 1949, no
provision for commercial arbitration was included. The 1950 Treaty with Ire-
land contains an arbitration clause quite different from that in the Treaty with
China. This Treaty more satisfactorily covers the important subject of enforce-
ment of foreign awards :21
Contracts entered into between nationals and companies of either Party
and nationals and companies of the other Party, that provide for the settle-
ment by arbitration of controversies, shall not be deemed unenforceable
within the territories of such other Party merely on the grounds that the
place designated for the arbitration proceedings is outside such territories
or that the nationality of one or more of the arbitrators is not that of such
other Party. No award duly rendered pursuant to any such contract, and
final and enforceable under the laws of the place where rendered, shall be
deemed invalid or denied effective means of enforcement within the terri-
tories of either Party merely on the grounds that the place where such
award was rendered is outside such territories or that the nationality of
one or more of the arbitrators is not that of such Party.
This clause introduces the minimal prohibition against denying effect to an
agreement or award merely because it contains an "alien" element. Moreover,
it extends the concept of reciprocity to awards involving arbitration physically
held in the territory of neither Party. The subsequent treaties with Colombia,
Denmark, Haiti, Israel, Italy, Nicaragua and Korea all followed this provi-
sion.
22
18. Article VI, para. (4) (T.I.A.S. No. 1871).
19. 63 Stat. 2255 (1948).
20. Senate Ex. D., 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
21. Article X (T.I.A.S. No. 2155).
22. Colombia: Senate Ex. M., 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); Denmark: Senate Ex. I,
82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1951) ; Haiti: Senate Ex. H, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955) ; Israel:
5 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 550, T.I.A.S. No. 2948 (1951); Italy: Senate F_x. H, 82d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1951) ; Nicaragua: 9 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 449 (1956) ; and Korea: 8 U.S.T. & O.I.A.
2217 (1957). This provision is also contained in a Convention of Establishment between
the United States and France, signed at Paris, November 25, 1959, and in a Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Pakistan signed at Washington on November
12, 1959. Both were submitted to the Senate on April 6, 1960.
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The 1951 Treaty with Greece contains an arbitration clause designed better
to adapt the concept of "national treatment" to a federal system:
... Awards duly rendered pursuant to any such contracts, which are
final and enforceable under the laws of the place where rendered, shall be
deemed conclusive in enforcement proceedings brought before the courts
of competent jurisdiction of either Party, and shall be entitled to be de-
clared enforceable by such courts, except where found contrary to public
policy. When so declared, such awards shall be entitled to privileges and
measures of enforcement appertaining to awards rendered locally. It is
understood, however, that awards rendered outside the United States of
America shall be entitled in any court in any State thereof only to the
same measure of recognition as awards rendered in other States thereof.
2 3
A similar clause was included in the recent treaties with Japan 24 and Ger-
many.
25
The most positive formulation used by the United States appears in the
1956 Treaty with The Netherlands, which contains the following arbitration
provision:
... (b) In conformity with subparagraphs (1) and (2) hereof, awards
duly rendered pursuant to any such contracts, which are final and enforce-
able under the laws of the place where rendered, shall be deemed conclu-
sive in enforcement proceedings brought before the courts of competent
jurisdiction of either Party. (1) As regards recognition and enforcement
in the United States of America, such awards shall be entitled in any
court in any State thereof only to the same measure of recognition and
enforcement as awards rendered in other States thereof. (2) As regards
enforcement in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, such awards shall be
dealt with in the same way as awards as referred to in the Convention on
the execution of foreign arbitral awards concluded at Geneva on Septem-
ber 26, 1927.26
The Netherlands treaty goes beyond the principle of non-discrimination and
makes proper foreign awards "conclusive" in the courts of either country. It
bars an investigation by the enforcing court of the correctness of the arbitra-
tor's findings of fact and conclusions of law. However, these awards are
granted no better procedures than domestic awards, and are still subject to the
public policy of the local court. Only the public policy of distrusting foreign
awards has been eliminated.
The advantage of the bilateral approach is that it facilitates the conclusion
of an arbitration treaty at any time, regardless of the stage of development of
local arbitration procedures. Moreover, it leaves each country free to experi-
ment with its internal arbitral procedures, automatically incorporating under
23. Article VI(2) (T.LA.S. No. 3057). The failure of this clause to limit enforce-
ment to those awards which would otherwise satisfy the Federal Arbitration Act may have
the effect of overriding the limitations in that Act.
24. Japan: 4 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863 (1953).
25. Germany: 7 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593 (1954).
26. Article V, para. 2 (T.I.A.S. No. 3942). Cf. note 23 supra.
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the treaty any improvements made in local arbitration procedures. The special
status of arbitration in each of the two countries can be easily taken into ac-
count, thus avoiding the "least common denominator" factor necessary in a
multilateral treaty.
The disadvantages of the bilateral approach lie in the disparity in the scope
and in the dispositive provisions of such treaties, and in the slow pace at which
the treaties are being negotiated and ratified. While bilateral treaties could
conceivably be the preferred mechanism for change, to date they have not been
effective. In part, this is because they have tended merely to incorporate the
existing law of the two nations rather than to evolve a uniform, albeit new,
law.
The Multilateral Approach
To avoid the disadvantages of the bilateral approach, some proponents of
international commercial arbitration have turned to the use of multilateral con-
ventions. The most ambitious attempt along these lines resulted in the "Geneva
Treaties"-the 1923 Protocol on Arbitration Clauses and the 1927 Convention
on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards.27 Efforts to enact a multilateral
convention on arbitration were made as early as 1904, and were intensified
after World War I through the mechanism of the League of Nations.28 It was
under the auspices of the League that the Protocol on Arbitral Clauses was
adopted in Geneva in 1923. Under this Protocol, each Contracting State
"recognizes the validity" of certain arbitral agreements, whether relating to
existing or future differences, and agrees that its courts, if invoked in defiance
of such an agreement, will refer the parties to the decision of the arbitrators.
The Geneva Protocol was followed by the 1927 Geneva Convention on the
Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards. In effect, in order to qualify for en-
forcement under the Geneva Convention, awards must arise from arbitration
agreements covered by the Geneva Protocol; they must be made in one of the
contracting States and must concern disputes between nationals of contracting
States.
There are certain positive tests which each award must meet in order to
qualify. It must arise from a valid arbitration agreement, it must deal with a
legally arbitral dispute, it must have been handed down by a properly con-
stituted tribunal and in conformity with the local procedural law, it must be
final in the country where made, and it must not violate the public policy of
the country where enforcement is sought. Even though these tests are satisfied,
the enforcing court may on its own motion refuse enforcement if it is satisfied
that the award has been annulled or that it resulted from defective procedures.
Although the Geneva Convention fails to fix the burden of proof on these tests,
27. The text of the Protocol is reprinted in 2 HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION
1062-65 and the Convention in 3 HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 2153-60 (1932).
28. The background of the Geneva treaties is outlined in Nussbaum, Treaties on Com-




most of them are of such a nature that the burden is on the plaintiff who has
obtained an award. The defendant who is seeking to block enforcement of the
award need disprove or rebut only one of the various tests to be successful.
The Geneva Treaties were not self-executing and, therefore, supplementary
national legislation by the contracting States was required.2 9 The legislation
enacted varied from country to country and left some doubt as to the extent
to which the signatory states actually carried out their obligations under the
treaties. For example, France and Poland incorporated the principles of the
Protocol into their general law, while Sweden so incorporated the principles
of both the Protocol and the Convention. Under the Swiss Constitution, rati-
fication and promulgation of the treaties were sufficient to make the treaties
domestic law. The treaties were transformed into internal law by legislation
in Belgium, Estonia, Greece, England, India, Italy and The Netherlands.
Estonia, France, Greece and The Netherlands limited the treaties to commer-
cial matters.
The Geneva treaties have not produced the widespread international en-
forcement of arbitration agreements and awards which was expected of them.
The primary blame for this failure appears to lie with the structure of the
treaties themselves. By effectively placing the burden of proof on every issue
upon the successful party, the treaties have eased the path of the defaulting
defendant and the partial tribunal.
An additional criticism of the treaties has been leveled at the diversity-of-
citizenship requirement; the treaties apply to differences between parties "sub-
ject respectively to the jurisdiction of different Contracting States." The un-
certainty engendered by this limitation is compounded by the varying national
theories concerning the elements of nationality.
The Present Status of Foreign Arbitral Agreements and Awards
Against this background of differing national policies, bilateral treaties and
multilateral conventions, it is not too surprising that the fate of any given
international arbitral agreement or award is uncertain. The crucial factor in
any controversy will be that of jurisdiction. The court of the country first ob-
taining jurisdiction will apply its own national policy, within the limitations of
its international obligations, to an international arbitral agreement or award
brought before it. In order to assess the advantages to be gained by accession
to the United Nations Convention, a look at the present status of arbitration
agreements and awards is in order.30
29. A survey of the supplementary legislation enacted is contained in Nussbaum. Id.
at 222-24.
30. See generally DomrE at 21, 42, 57, 118; Blom-Cooper, Enforcement of Foreign
Awards in England, 9 ARB. J. (n.s.) 198 (1954) ; Domke, On the Enforcement Abroad of
American Arbitration Awards, 17 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 545 (1952) ; Domke, Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards in the United States, 13 ARB. J. (n.s.) 91 (1958); An-
say, Commercial Arbitration in Turkey, 12 ARB. 3. (n.s.) 31, 34-37 (1957); Holley, En-
forcement of American Awards in France, 14 ARE. J. (n.s.) 83 (1959) ; Domke, Mendelson,
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Specific Perforntance and Stays of Litigation
On the state level in the United States the question of specifically enforcing
the arbitral clause through court stays or court orders is left to the discretion
of each state's legislature. In those states with modern arbitration statutes,
provision is generally made both for court stays and specific performance of
the arbitration clause. In states which retain the common law doctrine of
revocability of arbitration clauses as to future disputes, neither remedy is open
to the party seeking to enforce the arbitration clause. The potential effective-
ness of Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics 31 should be noted here.
This case held that arbitration agreements governed by the federal act "pre-
viously held by state law to be invalid, revocable or unenforceable are now
made 'valid, irrevocable and enforceable.' This is a declaration of national law
equally applicable in state or federal courts. '3 2 If that case is followed, then
& Rathkopf, Foreign Trade Arbitration in American Courts, 13 ARm. J. (n.s.) 30 (1958);
Philip, Commercial Arbitration in Denmark, 13 ARB. J. (n.s.) 16, 18-22 (1958) ; Bansal,
The Practice of Commercial Arbitration in India, 13 AR. J. (n.s.) 23 (1958) ; Espejo,
The Enforcement of American Awards in the Philippines, 13 ARB. J. (n.s.) 150 (1958).
31. 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 909 (1960) ; Note, 69 YALE
L.J. 847 (1960).
32. Id. at 407. The District Court had denied defendant's motion to stay judicial pro-
ceedings pending arbitration, on the ground that fraud in the inducement vitiates the agree-
ment to arbitrate. Reversing, the Court of Appeals held that federal law (the Federal
Arbitration Act) governed the validity and interpretation of the contract, and that federal
law sanctioned an agreement to arbitrate any dispute, including a claim of fraud in the
inducement. The Court admitted that New York law (fraud in the inducement is not
arbitrable), had it governed this New York contract involving interstate commerce, would
have produced a different result.
The Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act not only removed the common law
ban on enforcing "future disputes" agreements, but also directed the federal courts to
develop "principles of federal substantive law" with respect to the validity and interpreta-
tion of interstate arbitration agreements. This broad holding is at variance with the fol-
lowing three federal cases:
American Airlines v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 269 F.2d 811 (6th Cir.
1959) : Federal Arbitration Act merely removes common law ban on enforcing valid
arbitration contracts; invalidity of the contract for other reasons, e.g., fraud, lack
of consideration or capacity or authority to contract, is still governed by the appli-
cable substantive law of contracts, state or federal; plaintiff administrative board,
as a matter of Kentucky law, had no authority to enter contract providing for the
fixing of airport rental fees by arbitration.
Ross v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 236 F.2d 632, 634 (9th Cir. 1956):
"Next, it is argued that, even if this contract is the sort contemplated by Section 3
of Title 9 [U.S.C.], the interpretation of the contract is still a matter of California
law, and it must be determined by reference to that law whether the contract con-
tains language which amounts to a provision for arbitration. We think that this is
a correct analysis supported by Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America"
Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co. v. Lummus Co., 174 F. Supp. 485, 175 F. Supp. 873
(D.P.R. 1959), vacated, 280 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1960). The District Court held that
the Puerto Rican Arbitration Act governed a contract involving interstate com-




arbitration clauses contained in contracts evidencing transactions in foreign
commerce are, as a matter of federal substantive law, valid and irrevocable
whether litigated in a state or a federal court. Whether a state court could
merely give damages for breach of the clause while withholding specific per-
formance is yet to be decided.
On the federal level, sections 3 and 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act are
designed to allow enforcement of arbitral clauses in contracts involving foreign
commerce. But these sections are limited. Section 3 provides for a stay of court
proceedings in defiance of an arbitration clause, but only by "the court in
which such suit is pending." Section 4's provisions for specific performance of
the arbitral clause are available in "any court of the United States which, save
for such agreement, would have jurisdiction." Thus the availability of section
4 is circumscribed by the requirement of in personam jurisdiction and juris-
diction over the subject matter. The latter requirement involves finding an-
other basis for federal jurisdiction, either under the diversity-of-citizenship
clause or other federal subject-matter jurisdictions.
With regard to the enforceability of arbitration clauses abroad, the answer
varies from country to country, and is controlled both by each country's na-
tional law and also by the obligations it has incurred by multilateral and bi-
lateral treaties
3
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards
Once the arbitration has terminated in an award, the successful party desires
to enforce it with minimal procedural delay. In the United States, no state
arbitration statute makes any provision for the enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards ;34 therefore, there is no summary procedure to confirm an interstate
or foreign award in the state courts. This is true even as to those countries
with whom the United States has recently concluded treaties dealing with com-
mercial arbitration, since such treaties entitle foreign awards to no better treat-
ment than interstate awards. 35 In some states, however, the more cumbersome
procedure of suing upon the foreign award in state courts can achieve surpris-
ingly vigorous enforcement. In Gilbert v. Burnstine,36 for example, a British
33. Between countries that ratified the Geneva Protocol of 1923, supra note 27, at
1063-64; § 4 of that document requires:
The tribunals of the Contracting Parties, on being seized of a dispute regarding a
contract made between persons to whom Article 1 applies and including an Arbi-
tration Agreement whether referring to present or future differences which is valid
in virtue of the said article and capable of being carried into effect, shall refer the
Parties on the application of either of them to the decision of the Arbitrators.
34. Domke, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in the United States, 13 ARn. 3.
(n.s.) 91, 92 (1958) ; but see note 23 supra.
35. Although an interstate award reduced to judgment in the state of rendering must
be given full faith and credit in the other states, a foreign award reduced to judgment in
a foreign country is entitled to no such constitutional protection.
36. 255 N.Y. 348, 174 N.E. 706 (1931).
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arbitral award was held enforceable against a New York defendant even though
he had never appeared nor been served within the territory of the United
Kingdom. The New York court held that the arbitration agreement consti-
tuted a submission to the British Arbitration Act and to the jurisdiction of the
British courts for the enforcement of the agreementY7
The Federal Arbitration Act is of little use with regard to enforcement of
a foreign award in a federal court unless the arbitral agreement specifies a
court in which an order conforming the award may be made. The Act pro-
vides:
If no court is specified in the agreement of the parties, then such appli-
cation may be made to the United States Court in and for the district
within which such award was made.
38
Thus the successful party must, if he uses the federal courts, bring a common
law action upon the award, alleging some further basis of federal jurisdiction.3
With regard to enforcing foreign arbitral awards abroad, the answer again
varies with the national law of the countries involved and their status as parties
or non-parties to the Geneva Convention of 1927. The Geneva Convention
requires enforcement of awards rendered between nationals of the signers ac-
cording to local procedural rules. The actual effectiveness of the obligation
incurred under the Geneva Convention thus depends on the supplementary
national legislation.4" Between nonparties to the Geneva Convention, there is
little uniformity.41 Enforcement of an award rendered and reduced to judg-
37. The principle of this decision has since been incorporated into § 1450 of the
New York Civil Practice Act, which provides that the making of a contract providing for
arbitration in New York "shall be deemed a consent of the parties thereto to the juris-
diction of the Supreme Court of this state to enforce such contract or submission and to
enter judgment on an award thereon." The constitutionality of this provision is challenged
in Weiss, The Arbitration Award and the Non-Resident: Nuance in New York, 48 COLum.
L. REv. 366 (1948).
38. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1952).
39. E.g., Standard Magnesium Corp. v. Otto Fuchs, 251 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1957).
The plaintiff brought suit in a federal district court upon a Norwegian award rendered
ex parte according to the arbitration rules of the International Chamber of Commerce.
The defendant claimed that the Federal Arbitration Act did not provide for such an award
or such a suit, since no order to proceed with arbitration under § 4 had been made in the
case. This defense was rejected and judgment entered for the plaintiff, the court holding
that the invoking of § 4 was permissive and unnecessary where the parties had agreed in
advance to ex parte arbitration.
40. For example, the United Kingdom legislation adds a concept of reciprocity to the
conditions for enforcing Geneva awards. A foreign award rendered pursuant to an arbitral
agreement to which the Geneva Protocol applies is granted the same treatment as a do-
mestic British judgment if the award is between nationals of such contracting parties and
within such territories as the Crown may, on being satisfied that reciprocal provisions
exist, declare to be Parties and territories to which the Geneva Convention applies. Arbi-
tration Act, 1950, 14 Geo. 6, c. 27, § 35.
41. In the United Kingdom, for example, commentators have disagreed as to the en-
forceability of an award rendered in a country not a party to the Geneva Convention.
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ment in New York was denied by the Supreme Court of Portugal.42 On the
other hand, the Supreme Court of Colombia granted execution upon a New
York judgment based upon a New York award.
43
THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION OF 1958
Background 44
Soon after the establishment of the United Nations after World War II,
attempts were made to work out a multilateral solution to the problem of en-
forcing foreign arbitral awards. In 1953 the International Chamber of Com-
merce requested the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations to
conclude a Convention on the subject. On April 6, 1954, the Council estab-
lished an Ad Hoc Committee to study the Convention proposed by the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce. 45 This Ad Hoc Committee considered the
proposed Convention and eventually produced a Draft Convention of its own,46
which was submitted to various member and nonmember countries and also to
interested nongovernmental organizations for their comments. These comments
were submitted in the Secretary General's report to the Economic and Social
Council.
4 7
The Council decided to call a conference for the conclusion of a convention
on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and, further, "to
consider, if time permits, other possible measures for increasing the effective-
ness of arbitration in the settlement of private law disputes and to make such
recommendations as it may deem desirable." 48 The Conference convened from
May 20 to June 10, 1958, attended by representatives of 45 nations including
Schmitthof states that a foreign award creates a new obligation only if it has the status
of a judgment in the country where rendered and that, if the award does not so qualify,
the successful party should bring suit on the original cause of action. SCHMIrHroF, ENG-
LIsH CoNFLiCTs OF LAws 47-49 (3d ed. 1954); accord, DicEy, CONFLICT OF LAws 433
(6th ed. 1949). On the other hand, it is argued that a foreign arbitration award is in no
sense assimilable to a foreign judgment and that, in suing upon a foreign award, the plain-
tiff bases his action upon the agreement to arbitrate, the original cause of action having
been extinguished by the award. Blom-Cooper, Enforcement of Foreign Awards in Eng-
land, 9 ARB. J. (n.s.) 198 (1954).
42. Edmond Weil, Inc. v. Sociedade Industriale E Mercantil dos Olivias, Lda., S. Ct.
of Justice, Portugal, No. 53194 (Nov. 5, 1946). A Portuguese statute was held to require
litigation of the controversy in the Portuguese courts. Arbitration abroad of the dispute
was thus prohibited and the suit, based upon a New York judgment, was dismissed.
43. Hide Trading Corp. v. Field Echenique Compania, Ltda., S. Ct. of Justice, Colom-
bia, Gaceta Judicial Tomo, 68 No. 2087-88, at 139 (1951), translated in 6 ARB. J. (n.s.)
159 (1951).
44. For a brief summary of events leading up to the U.N. Convention, see Note, 53
Am. J. INT'L L. 414 (1959).
45. U.N. Economic and Social Council Res. No. 520 (XVII), 17th Sess., U.N. Eco-
NoM=c & SocIAL CouNcIL OFF. REC., Supp. No. 1.
46. U.N. Doc. No. E/AC 42/SR.10/3 (1955).
47. U.N. Doc. No. E/2822 (1956) and addenda 1 to 6.
48. U.N. Economic and Social Council Resolution No. 604 (XXI), 21st Sess., U.N.
Economics & Social Council Off. Rec., Supp. No. 1 (1956).
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the United States and Soviet Russia. Three intergovernmental organizations
and ten nongovernmental organizations also took part. On June 10, in its Final
Act,49 the Conference adopted the Convention which it had drafted, and also
made several recommendations 50 to the Economic and Social Council for fur-
ther measures needed to increase the effectiveness of arbitration in the settle-
ment of private law disputes.
Ten nations signed the Convention on June 10, 1958, and 13 more nations
signed it within the period open for signature-until December 31, 1958.
Pursuant to Article I of the Convention, Morocco, France, Czechoslovakia,
India, USSR, Byelorussian SSR, and Ukrainian SSR limited their ratification
to awards made in the territory of other contracting states, and France and
India limited their ratification to differences deemed "commercial" under their
national law. Pursuant to Article X, France extended its accession to all terri-
tories included in the French Republic.
Provisions
The President of the Conference summarizes the anticipated advantages of
the Convention as follows:
... it was already apparent that the document represented an improve-
ment on the Geneva Convention of 1927. It gave a wider definition of the
awards to which the Convention applied; it reduced and simplified the
requirements with which the party seeking recognition or enforcement of
an award would have to comply; it placed the burden of proof on the
party against whom recognition or enforcement was invoked; it gave the
parties greater freedom in the choice of the arbitral authority and of the
arbitration procedure; it gave the authority before which the award was
sought to be relied upon the right to order the party opposing the enforce-
ment to give suitable security. 51
Coverage
The Convention applies to all awards made in the territory of a State "other
than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are
sought" and also to awards "not considered as domestic awards in the State
where their recognition and enforcement are sought."52 This definition includes
49. U.N. Doc. No. E/CoNF. 26/9IREv. 1, of June 10, 1958.
50. The discussion of these other matters and recommendations in connection there-
with are summarized in the Official Report of the United States Delegation to the United
Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration 16-17, 25-27 (August 15,
1958) [hereinafter cited as U.S. DEL. REP.].
51. U.N. Doc. No. E/CoNF. 26/SR.25, at 2 (1958). See generally Contini, International
Commercial Arbitration--The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
inent of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 8 Am. J. Co p. L. 283 (1959); Pisar, The United
Nations Convention on Foreign Arbitral Awards, 33 So. CAL. L. REv. 14 (1959); Sultan,
The United Nations Arbitration Convention and United States Policy, 53 Am. J. INT'L L.
807 (1959).
52. Article I. The legislative history of this and other articles in the Convention is
summarized in HAIGHT, CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT or FOREIGN
AwARns (1958) [hereinafter cited as HAIGHT]; U.S. DE.. REP.
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the territorial concept and special local definitions of "domestic," such as the
French position that an award made in France under foreign law is regarded
as a non-domestic award. The non-domestic criterion is not a limitation on the
territorial test. The Convention applies to all awards rendered outside the en-
forcing State and to awards rendered inside the enforcing State if that State
does not regard the award as domestic. 3 The Convention is not limited to
commercial disputes, but applies explicitly to any award not considered domes-
tic by the nation where enforcement is sought. There is no diversity of citizen-
ship clause. The Convention applies to awards "arising out of differences be-
tween persons, whether physical or legal," and thus appears to cover nations
in their commercial relationships. It also applies to awards made by permanent




Notwithstanding the breadth of the coverage provisions, Article 1 (3) of the
Convention provides that any nation may "on the basis of reciprocity" declare
that it will apply the Convention to awards made only in the territory of an-
other Contracting State,m5 or that it will apply the Convention only to differ-
ences arising out of legal relationships "considered as commercial under the
national law of the State making such declaration." 56 These possible limita-
tions-the exclusion of awards rendered in the territory of the declarant or
in the territory of a noncontracting nation, and of noncommercial disputes-
are relatively unimportant. They were inserted for the benefit of countries like
Belgium whose arbitration law is limited to commercial matters, and for the
benefit of territorially-minded countries. What is important is the principle of
allowing reservations.
Israel and several other nations had argued for unlimited reservations;
53. The Convention apparently also overrides the German policy that an award ren-
dered anywhere under German Procedural law is a domestic German award and the Italian
position that any award between Italians is domestic. This extension was agreed to when
the delegates expected that reservations on this subject would be allowed, but the final draft
of the Convention omitted such reservations. U.S. DEL. REP. 6, 11-12.
54. But cf. U.S. DEL. REP. 6:
It is definitely understood, however, that the convention applies only to awards re-
suiting from arbitrations to which the parties have submitted voluntarily. If the
arbitration were conducted by a permanent body to which the parties are obligated
to refer their disputes regardless of their will, the proceedings are judicial rather
than arbitral in character and the resulting award consequently would not come
within the purview of the convention.
55. This language seems to allow a State to undercut the "non-domestic" provision
of Article I(1) by reserving awards rendered in the territory of the declarant.
56. See U.S. Dns.. REP. 7:
The phrase "legal relationships whether contractual or not" is employed to assure
coverage not only for disputes arising under commercial contracts but for other dis-
putes, such as damage claims, which might come within the scope of the commercial
code.
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Japan and the U.S.S.R. argued for no reservations at all. Both extremes were
rejected.57 As a compromise the phrase "on the basis of reciprocity" was in-
serted in the first sentence of Article 1(3). The effect of this phrase is not at
all clear, however. It may mean that the power to limit application of the Con-
vention to territorial awards is contingent upon a reciprocal reservation by an-
other contracting party. But which party? Would one suffice? Or it may mean
that any state may freely impose the reservation, but at the price of losing the
power to enforce abroad whatever awards in the other it refuses to enforce it-
self. This final interpretation would render the clause superfluous, however, for
such reciprocal nonenforcement is already provided for in the broad recipro-
city clause in Article XIV.
The second reservation-to commercial differences (presumably the appli-
cation of both Article II as to agreements and Article I as to awards are meant
to be covered by "differences") -is not literally qualified by "on the basis of
reciprocity." That this was to be an unqualified power to limit application of
the Convention to commercial differences seems evident from the fact that it
was inserted at the insistence of Belgium, which stated it could not accede to
the Convention without such a reservation.5 8
The intent of some delegates to curtail further reservations was expressed
in Section 14 of the Final Act of the Conference:
14. The Conference decided that, without prejudice to the provisions
of its Articles 1(3), X, XI and XIV, no reservations shall be admissible
to the "Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards." 59
But this intent was not unanimous. For example, the delegate of Israel de-
clared that his delegation would sign the Convention "without prejudice to its
attitude on the admissibility of reservations under the general principles of
public international law." 60 The possibility of an accession being held void
because of an attempted reservation is slim, but cannot be disregarded.6 '
Recognition of Arbitral Agreements
Article II(1) requires each State to "recognize" agreements in writing,62
to submit to arbitration past or future differences arising between the parties
57. HAIGHT 13.
58. U.N. Doc. No. E/CoNF. 26/L. 63, at 7 (1958); HAIGHT 16.
59. U.N. Doc. No. E/CoNF. 26/9IREv. 1, at 4 (1958).
60. U.N. Doc. No. E/CoNF. 26/SR.24, at 12 (1958); HAIGHT 17.
61. Cf. The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in Reservations
to the Genocide Convention, [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 15 ("... it is the compatability of a reser-
vation with the object and purpose of the convention that must furnish the criterion ...
of membership.").
62. With respect to the requirement that the agreement be in writing, Article 11(2)
provides:
The term "agreement in writing" shall include an arbitral clause in a contract or
an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of let-
ters or telegrams.
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"in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concern-
ing a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration."
This extraordinary provision has many facets. Most notably, it makes no
attempt to define the kinds of agreements which Contracting States are re-
quired to recognize. There are no words indicating that the arbitral agreements
meant are those with a foreign or "non-domestic" element. Despite the con-
stant insistence of the German delegate that the arbitral agreements be related
to an arbitral award capable of enforcement under the Convention 3 the Con-
ference adopted the Article without any words so linking the agreements to
the awards covered by Article 111.64
Furthermore, the words "and enforce," so prominent in Article I and Article
III, are absent from Article II. Sweden introduced Article 11 (1) in an attempt
to re-enact the first article of the Geneva protocol which required member
States to "recognize the validity" of arbitral agreements.65 The Conference
debated whether the Economic and Social Council Resolution calling the Con-
ference authorized it to deal at all with agreements, and was finally convinced
by the United Kingdom delegate that a Convention on awards with no pro-
vision recognizing the underlying arbitral agreement would be too easily nulli-
fied.66 Several of the delegates felt that this Article would undercut the pro-
visions on awards, since courts would be required "to treat as valid an agree-
ment resulting in an arbitral award that could not be enforced under Article
IV(1) of the Convention. ' 67 This argument, based on the Convention's failure
to restrict the agreements to those concerning awards enforceable under Arti-
cles I and III, was instrumental in causing the deletion of the words "as valid"
after "recognize."68 Whatever "recognize" may now mean, after that debate, it
63. HAIGHT 27.
64. Cf. U.S. DEL. REP. 19:
Its language is such as to extend the treaty rule to purely domestic contracts as
well.
The similar failure to limit the stay provisions of § 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act to
those arbitration agreements evidencing "a transaction involving commerce" within the
meaning of § 2 of the Act created a split of opinion among the federal courts over the
issue whether § 3 stood on its own footing which was not resolved until Bernhardt v. Poly-
graphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 201 (1956) held § 3 limited by § 2.
65. Article I of the Geneva Protocol provides:
Each of the Contracting States recognizes the validity of an agreement whether
relating to existing or future differences between parties subject respectively to the
jurisdiction of different Contracting States by which the parties to a contract agree
to submit to arbitration all or any differences that may arise in connection with such
contracts relating to commercial matters or to any other matter capable of settle-
ment by arbitration, whether or not the arbitration is to take place in a country to
whose jurisdiction none of the parties is subject.
The text of the Protocol is reprinted in 2 HuDsoN, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 1062-65.
66. HAIGHT 25.
67. U.N. Doc. No. E/CoNF. 26/SR.21, at 19-20 (1958).
68. HAIGHT 25.
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seems clear that it does not require a Contracting State to grant specific per-
formance of the agreement by ordering a recalcitrant party to arbitrate.
Finally, Article II(1) is limited to arbitration of differences concerning a
subject matter "capable of settlement by arbitration." This phrase endows the
courts of the forum State with authority to decide the "arbitrability" of dis-
putes.69 Considerable latitude is thus afforded the tribunal deciding the issue
of arbitrability, and to that extent the predictability of result under the Con-
vention is weakened. Presumably, this determination is to be made upon the
basis of the law to which the parties have subjected their agreement. Failing
such a designation, arbitrability might be decided by the law of the State
where the agreement was signed, where the dispute arose or where the agree-
ment is sought to be enforced.
7 0
Stay of Litigation
Article 11(3) requires a court of a Contracting State, "when seized of an
action in a matter" involving an arbitral agreement, to refer the parties to
arbitration, "unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, inopera-
tive or incapable of being performed."
The article does not explicitly relate arbitral agreements which will be the
basis for a stay order to arbitral awards capable of enforcement under the
Convention. Such a limitation should be implied, however, since the only justi-
fication for the stay is the necessity of protecting awards capable of enforce-
ment. A more serious omission is the absence of any provision defining the law
which governs the issue whether the arbitral agreement is "null and void, in-
operative or incapable of being performed." Presumably, the law specified by
the parties in their agreement should govern. Absent such a specification, the
forum State might look to its own law and policy, or to the law of the place
of execution of the agreement, or to the law of the place where the dispute
arose.
7 1
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards-the Basic Obligation
Article III requires each Contracting State "to recognize arbitral awards as
binding" and to enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the
69. For a review of the problems created by vesting this power in the judiciary, see
Kharas & Koretz, Judicial Determnsatioit of the Arbitrable Issue, 11 ARB. J. (n.s.) 135
(1956).
70. The corresponding provision with regard to awards in Article V 2.(a) relegates
the issue of the arbitrability of the subject matter of the dispute to determination under
the law-of the country where enforcement of the award is sought. It can be expected that
the courts of the State where recognition of the agreement is sought will adopt a similar
standard of judging the arbitrability of the dispute under the law of the forum.
71. The corresponding provision in Article V 2.(b) allows the forum State to refuse
enforcement of an award if the recognition and enforcement of the award would be con-
trary to its public policy. It can be expected that the forum State will similarly refuse to
stay litigation or to order the parties to arbitration where its public policy renders the
arbitral agreement "null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed."
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forum State. The forum State must not impose "substantially more onerous
conditions or higher fees or charges" on the recognition or enforcement of
arbitral awards to which the Convention applies than it imposes on the recog-
nition or enforcement of domestic arbitral awards. Unfortunately, this article,
which defines the fundamental obligation imposed by the Convention, is im-
precisely drafted.
The Conference again failed explicitly to limit the arbitral awards meant to
those awards defined by Article I. The first sentence of Article III, standing
alone, states an obligation on the part of Contracting States to recognize and
enforce all arbitral awards, foreign or domestic. That the delegates meant to
limit this sentence to Article I awards is the reading suggested by the state-
ments of various delegates.
The drafting of this Article was complicated by the desires of some delegates
to institute a uniform system of international procedural rules of enforcement
for foreign awards. While this goal would increase the reliability of arbitral
agreements, its achievement seemed premature in light of the widely divergent
national attitudes toward arbitration. A counterproposal was made by Belgium
that the same rules of local procedure be made applicable to foreign and do-
mestic awards. The delegate from the United States supported this proposal,
citing the success of the "principle of national treatment" in recent United
States bilateral treaties.7 2 On the other hand, several States pointed out that
their local procedures for enforcing foreign awards differed from those appli-
cable to domestic awards; El Salvador and Sweden declared that their law
required foreign awards to be submitted to the Court for a determination
whether the requirements of relevant international instruments had been satis-
fied, while domestic awards are granted summary execution.
73
Because the Belgian proposal was rejected,7 4 the Contracting States have
been left free to establish different procedures for the recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign awards and domestic awards, within the limits of the "sub-
stantially more onerous conditions" rule. The Contracting States do not have
much discretion under this rule, however, as the legislative history suggests
that any condition going beyond a reasonable method of ascertaining that the
award is covered by the Convention- would be substantially more onerous.
A final problem of construction under Article III has to do with the effect
to be given the foreign arbitral award. In some countries, domestic and foreign
awards are equally unenforceable. Presumably the words- "-ecognize. as
binding and enforce them -in accordance w(ith the -ules of procedure,", under
the conditions laid down in the Convention,-changes..the law of such -States as
to foreign awards. A nation with no procedure, for 'enforcing domestic awards
would presumably be required by Article III to provide some such procedure
72. See U.N. Doc. No. E/CoiF. 26/SR.10, at 3 (1958).
73. HAIGHT 30-31.
74. U.N. Doc. No. E/CoNF. 26/SR.11, at 5 (1958). The second sentence of Article
III, which had been a proviso on the first, was then made a separate sentence to make clear
that it is a separate obligation of the Contracting States.
19611 1065
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
for foreign awards. In those countries where domestic awards are recognized,
but given effect only as rebuttable presumptions of fact in a subsequent court
proceeding, the effect of Article III is not so dear. Apparently such countries
must grant a more "binding" effect to foreign awards, but the standard they
must meet is not specified. The Convention forbids States to treat foreign
awards substantially worse than they treat domestic awards, but it does not
declare how much better they must treat foreign awards.
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards-Proving the Award
The U.N. Convention places the burden of proof on the issue of validity on
the defendant. The proponent of the award is required only to supply the orig-
inal or a certified copy of the award and the arbitral agreement.75 These estab-
lish a prima facie case, and the burden shifts to the defendant to establish the
invalidity of the award on one of the grounds specified in Article V 1.
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards-Grounds for Refusal
Article V lists five grounds upon which the award may be refused recog-
nition and enforcement upon the request of the defendant, and two further
grounds upon which the competent authority of the forum State may on its
own motion refuse recognition and enforcement. Two important themes run
through the seven grounds of invalidity. The first is that of ultimate judicial
control over enforcement of the award, the problem of the "double exequa-
tur."76 The ultimate authority was placed in the enforcing State, but Article
V 1. (e) allows the defendant to attack the award on the ground that it has
not yet become binding or has been set aside or suspended by a competent
authority "of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was
made." The second important theme is contractual autonomy. 77 The represen-
tatives of the International Chamber of Commerce advocated a proposal which
would allow the parties to select the law of any country to pick principles of
decision to govern the arbitration without regard to such law. Only the first of
these was accepted, and is reflected throughout Article V. Complete divorce
of the arbitral process from the law of some State was thought to be too revo-
lutionary a concept for a Convention which was intended to be ratified by a
large number of nations.
78
75. Article IV. See U.S. DEL. REP. 19:
While this article does not raise major difficulties, its provisions appear to be con-
trary to a number of minor State statutory procedures for the filing of documents
with the court before which enforcement proceedings are brought.
76. See generally HAIGHT 34-35, 39-44; U.S. DEL. REP. 14-16. Proposals were made
that the award be subject to review only in the country where rendered, or only in the
country where enforcement was sought, or both.
77. See HAIGHT 36-37; U.S. Dn. REP. 11-13, 17-19.
78. The reasons that the U.S. delegation opposed complete autonomy of the parties
were given as follows:
Bearing in mind that parties seldom negotiate a contract in terms of equal bargain-
ing power, free choice of the procedural law of arbitration could be detrimental to
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Article V 1. (a): The Absence of a Valid Arbitration Agreement.
The parties to the agreement referred to in Article II were, under the
law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is
not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing
any indication thereon, under the law of the country where the award was
made;
There should be no enforcement of an award against a party who never
agreed to arbitrate. The Convention allows the enforcing State to examine the
validity of the agreement, but only under the law which the parties have chosen.
If the parties have made no choice of law, then the law of the State where the
award was made governs. However, the capacity of the parties to contract is to
be judged by "the law applicable to them." This provision allows the enforcing
State to apply its Conflicts of Laws principles in arriving at the law governing
the capacity of the parties. This provision, unlike Article II, contains no re-
quirement that the agreement be in writing. Presumably, the same sort of
agreement as provided for in Article II is meant, and it is difficult to see how
the proponent could supply the enforcing State with a copy of it, as required
by Article IV, unless it were in writing.79 For the same reason, it also appears
that the choice of law by the parties must be in the agreement itself.
Article V 1. (b): Lack of a Fair Opportunity to be Heard.
The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper
notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceed-
ings or was otherwise unable to present his case;
This clause incorporates a basic concept of due process into the Convention.
The word "proper" was adopted to take care of the situation where the de-
fendant was "under a legal incapacity."' 0 The Conference adopted the phrase
"or was otherwise unable to present his case" upon the insistence of the rep-
resentative of the Netherlands that such a provision was needed to deal with
the circumstance where force majeure or other cause operated to prevent a
party from presenting his case, or where he was not given adequate opportunity
to do so.8 '
the economically weaker party. It could mean choice of a law that would let the
stronger harass the weaker into an unwanted arbitration. It could mean as well
choice of a law friendly to quick ex parte proceedings and careless as to require-
ments of service on the defending-party.
U.S. DEL. REP. 18.
79. HAIGHT 51-53.
80. U.N. Doc. No. E/CoNF. 26/SR.17, at 9, 14 (1958).
81. U.N. Doc. No. E/CoNF. 26/SR.23, at 15 (1958). It should be noted that there is
no specification of the standards for judging the propriety of the notice or the adequacy of
the opportunity to be heard. By reference to the preceding clause, it can be argued that
the law chosen by the parties or the law of the rendering State should govern. On the other
hand, the concept of due process is closely linked with the public policy of the forum, and
it can be expected that the enforcing State will apply its own standards of due process.
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Article V 1. (c): The Award or an Inseverable Part of it Exceeds the Sub-
mission to Arbitration.
The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling
within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions
on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided
that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated
from those not so submitted, that part of the award which contains de-
cisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be recognized and en-
forced;
This basic provision merely reiterates the principle of Article V 1. (a) that
an award should not be enforced against a party who never agreed to arbitrate
the subject matter of it. The Conference passed it with no debate, save over
the severability proviso. The Belgian and U.S.S.R. delegates argued for the
deletion of the proviso on the ground that it would become a source of con-
fusion. But the Indian delegate carried the day with the argument that:
If the enforcing court was not authorized to sever that (extraneous)
matter from the remainder of the award and was obliged to refuse enforce-
ment altogether merely because a small detail fell outside the scope of the
arbitral agreement, the applicant might suffer unjustified hardship.
82
Article V 1. (d): Improper Composition of the Arbitral Tribunal or Improper
Arbitral Procedure.
The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was
not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agree-
ment, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbi-
tration took place;
This clause provoked another debate over the subject of contractual auton-
omy.83 One group, led by the International Chamber of Commerce and France,
advocated contractual freedom to designate an arbitral procedure independent
of the law of any country. The other group, represented by Italy and the
United States, argued for complete subjection of the arbitral procedure to the
law of the country where the award was made. The resulting compromise lends
itself to two interpretations. On the one hand, the absence of a provision re-
stricting the parties to a choice of law indicates complete autonomy in the
selection of the arbitral procedure.84 On the other hand, Article V 1. (a) re-
82. U.N. Doc. No. E/CoNF. 26/SR.17, at 9 (1958). The Conference again failed to
specify what law would govern this issue of transgression of authority by the arbitrators,
or the severability thereof. Application of the law of the forum would undercut the relia-
bility of an arbitral agreement. The better approach would be to square the provision with
Article V 1. (a) by looking to the law chosen by the parties or, absent such choice, to the
law of the State where the award was made.
83. HAIGHT 56-59.
84. Cf. U.S. DEL. REP. 8-9:
The parties are free to choose the procedural law which is to govern their arbitra-
tion. It thus would not preclude the conduct of an arbitration under procedures at
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quires that the arbitral agreement be valid under "the law" to which the parties
have subjected it. The Italian delegate was probably correct in stating that the
paragraph "had been inserted on the understanding that the parties enjoyed
discretion only to the extent that they could select the national law applicable
in the matter."r5
Article V 1. (e): The Award Is Not Binding or Has Been Set Aside or Sus-
pended.
The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set
aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or
under the law of which, that award was made.
This paragraph reflects the inability of the Conference to agree on the solu-
tion to the problem of the "double exequatur."86 No one wanted the Conven-
tion to require judicial proceedings in confirmation of the award in both the
rendering and enforcing State. At the same time, an award which had been
set aside by competent authority in the State where rendered should hardly be
granted enforcement in another State.
The hardest question is the status in the enforcing State of an award that
has not been set aside but is still subject to review in the rendering State by
appeal or other procedures. The Conference rejected the requirement that the
award be "final and operative" in the rendering State, yet was unwilling to
make awards enforceable as soon as rendered.
In the confusion over the word "binding," there was no discussion of the
phrase "or under the law of which." While this parallels the provision in Arti-
cle V 1. (a) granting the parties the power to pick the law governing their
agreement, the matter of setting aside the award is an entirely different matter.
This phrase provides that when an award is rendered in one state under the
law of a second state, the courts of that second state may set aside or suspend
the award. Such a debatable result is probably not provided for under the
national law of most of the States under whose law the award might have been
made.
variance with or even illegal under the law of the place of arbitration and enforce-
ment could be denied only if the procedures actually used constituted a breach of the
agreement to arbitrate.
85. U.N. Doc. No. E/CoNF. 26/SR.17, at 10 (1958). Even this limited freedom of
choice has been questioned by the U.S. Delegation:
In the United States, however, the courts have tended to regard party choice of law
as contrary to public policy at least with respect to some subject matter. While the
public policy reservation in paragraph 2 would suffice to cover this situation, United
States adherence to the convention would be misleading where paragraph 1 is con-
cerned. Other countries would naturally assume that such adherence entailed accept-
ance of the principle of party choice of law to the extent contemplated by paragraph
1.
U.S. DXT. REP. 20.
86. HAIGHTI 34-35, 39-44, 59-65.
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Significantly, the paragraph fails to specify the grounds upon which the ren-
dering State may set aside or suspend the award. While it would have pro-
vided greater reliability to the enforcement of awards under the Convention
had the available grounds been defined in some way, such action would have
constituted meddling with national procedure for handling domestic awards, a
subject beyond the competence of the Conference.
Article V 2. (a): Subject Matter Not Arbitrable
The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by
arbitration under the law of that country;
This ground, and the following one, may be raised either by the defendant
or by the competent authority before which the award is brought for enforce-
ment.
This paragraph carries over the similar provision in Article 1. (b) of the
Geneva Convention.8 7 France opposed its inclusion in the Convention on the
ground that domestic standards of arbitrability should not be applied to inter-
national awards.88 Germany agreed, pointing out that matters which sharply
conflicted with strong local policies could be handled under the public policy
clause.8 9 The paragraph was adopted, however, and the enforcing State is thus
empowered to decide the "arbitrability" of the dispute under its local stand-
ards.90 A certain degree of forum-shopping by successful parties is thus as-
sured.
Article V 2. (b): The Public Policy of the Forum
The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the
public policy of that country.
This paragraph has the effect of relegating the ultimate decision on the effi-
cacy of the Convention to the good faith of the Contracting States. The only
debate in the Conference centered on the proposal to add the phrase "or with
fundamental principles of the law (ordre public)" after "public policy," 9' 1 which
would have carried over the language of Article 1. (e) of the Geneva Conven-
87. Article 1 (b) of the Geneva Convention provides:
To obtain such recognition or enforcement, it shall, further be necessary: ...
(b) That the subject-matter of the award is capable of settlement by arbitration
under the law of the country in which the award is sought to be relied upon;




90. Compare the law of New York, for example, which forbids arbitration of almost
all controversies "respecting a claim to an estate in real property, in fee or for life." N.Y.
Crv. PRAc. AcT § 1448.
91. See generally HAIGHT 67-71.
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tion.92 This was in effect a debate over the scope of the phrase "public policy,"
and the decision not to add the second phrase may be read as a broadening of
the definition of that term.93
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards-Discretionary Stay on Adequate
Security
Article VI, which completes the basic operative section of the Convention,
provides that when the losing party has applied for the setting aside or sus-
pension of the award to the competent authority of the country in which, or
under the law of which, the award was made, the enforcing forum may in its
discretion adjourn the decision on the enforcement of the award. If the pro-
ponent of the award requests it, the forum may in its discretion order the other
party to give suitable security.
This provision is a reasonable complement to Article V 1. (e), and eases the
situations where the "double exequatur" problem arises. 94 However, the pro-
vision is wholly discretionary, and the enforcing State is free to refuse adjourn-
ment and to enforce the award, nullification proceedings in the rendering State
notwithstanding. The Convention contains no terms covering the situation
where an award is later set aside by the rendering State. Presumably the de-
fendant would be entitled to petition for relief and restitution under standard
equitable doctrines of the enforcing State's national law.
Effect on Other Treaties
Article VII leaves undisturbed rights that have been or may be acquired
under national law or under other treaties concerning the recognition and en-
forcement of arbitral awards. The Geneva Treaties, however, were felt to be
too similar to the U.N. Convention to remain as conflicting obligations of the
Contracting States.95 Article VII therefore provides that the two Geneva
treaties shall cease to have effect between Contracting States "on their becom-
ing bound and to the extent that they become bound by this Convention."
92. Article 1(e) of the Geneva Convention provides:
That the recognition or enforcement of the award is not contrary to the public policy
or to the principles of the law of the country in which it is sought to be relied upon.
93. As noted above, France and Germany thought the phrase broad enough to cover
arbitrability. Italy indicated that it would handle cases of res judicata under this heading.
U.N. Doc. No. E/CoNF. 26/SR.17, at 15 (1958). Furthermore, the representatives of
several countries thought that the problem of evasion of domestic law by two citizens arbi-
trating abroad could be taken care of under the heading of public policy. HAIGHT 70.
94. This Article has been criticized by the U.S. Delegation:
The provision for the posting of security by the defendant, however, appears open
to grave objection. Although it is permissive in character, it has the unusual and
exceptionable effect of penalizing a defendant for seeking to defend his rights . . .
U.S. DEL. REP. 20.
95. HAIGHT 72-74.
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Thus, those members of the Geneva Convention who fail to accede to the U.N.
Convention remain bound by their obligations thereunder. While the words of
Article VII could be read as providing that Contracting States under the
U.N. Convention who limit their accession by reservations remain bound by
the Geneva Convention to the extent of such reservations, it seems unlikely
that this was the intended meaning.
States Eligible to Accede to the Convention
Articles VIII and IX deal with the subject of the States which are eligible
to become Contracting States under the Convention. The Polish delegate pro-
posed that the Convention be open to all states, but this suggestion was re-
jected by the Conference." Thus the Convention may be ratified under Article
VIII or acceded to under Article IX only by a Member of the United Nations
or any other State which is or hereafter becomes a member of any specialized
agency of the United Nations, or which is or hereafter becomes a party to the
Statute of the International Court of Justice, or any state to which an invita-
tion has been addressed by the General Assembly of the United Nations.
9 7
The Colonial Clause
Article X authorizes a Contracting State to extend the Convention to all or
any of the territories for the international relations of which it is responsible,
either simultaneously with its ratification or accession to the Convention, or
at any time thereafter by a notification addressed to the Secretary-General of
the United Nations. With regard to those territories to which the Convention
is not extended, a Contracting State need merely "consider the possibility" of
taking the necessary steps to extend the Convention, subject, where neces-
sary for constitutional reasons, to the consent of the Governments of such
territories.
The Federal Clause
Article XI provides that, with respect to those articles of the Convention
which come "within the legislative jurisdiction of the federal authority," the
obligations of the federal Government of federal States shall be the same as
those of unitary States. With respect to those Articles of the Convention that
come "within the legislative jurisdiction of constituent states or provinces which
are not, under the constitutional system of the federation, bound to take legis-
lative action," the Federal Government need only favorably recommend such
articles to its States. A federal contracting State must, upon request, furnish a
statement of the extent to which any provisions of the Convention has been
made effective in the federation by legislation or other action.
96. U.N. Doc. No. E/CoNF. 26/SR.19, at 3-4 (1958).
97. The U.S. Delegation unsuccessfully opposed this provision on the ground that it
would permit signature of the Convention by unrecognized regimes. U.S. DEt.. REP. 9.
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The Soviet bloc challenged this Article for permitting privileged federal
states "to evade some of the obligations imposed by the Convention."' 8 Aus-
tralia, on the other hand, said that without the article its country "would, at
best, be able to ratify the convention only after a long delay and, at worst, not
at all." 00 On this basis of necessity, the article was adopted. 100
The perplexing question of reciprocity in relation to this Article was dis-
cussed at length in the Conference. At this point, there was no general reci-
procity clause like Article XIV in the Convention, but the need for such a pro-
vision in the federal clause was felt. Accordingly, the Conference adopted a
paragraph 2 to Article XI, which read:
A federal or non-unitary State shall not be entitled to avail itself of this
Convention against other States except to the extent that it is bound to
apply this Convention.'
Norway then proposed to add the words:
And in particular not as to awards made in a constituent state or a
province to which the State is not bound to apply the Convention. 0 2
Norway's amendment was defeated by the strange vote of 6 to 1, with 22
abstentions. Had this provision been inserted in the convention, it would have
posed serious problems of interpretation both under the colonial clause and
under the federal clause.' 0 3 Shortly thereafter the Conference adopted the
reciprocity clause in Article XIV, and deleted this special reciprocity clause
from Article XI.104
98. U.N. Doc. No. E/CoNF. 26/SR20, at 5 (1958).
99. Id. at 6.
100. The federal clause has been criticized as useful only to federations with clearly
defined legislative powers. E.g., U.S. DEL. REP. 21, 22:
The former [Art. XI] is so framed that practical application to the situation of the
U.S. is impossible. This is mainly because the "federal state clause" as developed
apparently had in mind a system in which there was a clear division of authority
between central and local governments in arbitration matters. It evidently failed to
visualize a system in which central and local governments maintained concurrent
and even to some ex-tent overlapping jurisdiction in arbitration matters...
This is not to say, however, that article XI is not well adapted to the require-
ments of some federal systems. It appears from the Conference debates, for example,
that a provision in these terms is vital from the standpoint of Australia, where the
central government appears to have no authority in arbitration matters and where
thus there is no problem of concurrent jurisdiction.
101. U.N. Doc. No. E/CoNF. 26/L.61, at 5-6 (1958).
102. HAIGHT 83.
103. Though proposed during the debate over the federal clause, this phrase would be
a meaningless qualification on that clause. Either no U.S. awards could be enforced, since
all such awards are rendered "in a constituent state," or every award could be enforced,
since the U.S. would be "bound to apply the Convention" in the territory of every state.
104. HAIGHT 83.
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Reciprocity
The Conference did not adopt a reciprocity clause until the last day, when
Article XIV was inserted.
A Contracting State shall not be entitled to avail itself of the present
Convention against other Contracting States except to the extent that it
is itself bound to apply the Convention. 10 5
The adopion of this Article gives States a defensive right to take advantage
of another State's reservations with regard to territorial, federal or other pro-
visions. The clause presumably will also cover the case where the courts of a
State have placed a restrictive interpretation upon its obligations under the
Convention.'06
ACCEssIoN By THE UNITED STATES
The United States was not a signatory to either the Geneva Protocol or the
Geneva Convention, and the United States Delegation to the U.N. Conference
has recommended that the United States not accede to the U.N. Convention.'0 "
105. The Ad Hoc Committee has attempted to avoid such a clause as inappropriate
for a convention on arbitration.
If a State made a reservation because of the special features of its domestic legis-
lation-for example, because it regarded certain awards made abroad as domestic-
other States were obviously not compelled to adopt these special features. The Ad
Hoc Committee had therefore been quite right in not basing the draft Convention
on the idea of reciprocity, at least with regard to the possible reservations.
U.N. Doc. No. E/CoNF. 26/SR.20, at 7 (1958).
106. The Conference also adopted some minor provisions. Under Article XIII, any
Contracting State can denounce the convention by written notification to the Secretary-
General of the U.N., the denunciation to take effect one year after receipt of the notifica-
tion. In like manner, a Contracting State which has extended the Convention to one of its
territories under Article X may denounce the extension. If proceedings for the recognition
or enforcement of an arbitral award have been instituted before the denunciation takes
effect, they shall continue to be governed by the Convention.
Article XII deals with the time the convention becomes effective. Pursuant to this
Article, the Convention came into force on June 7, 1959, between Israel, Morocco and the
U.A.R. For any State becoming a Contracting Party in the future, the Convention shall
become effective 90 days after deposit of the instrument of ratification or accession. Article
XV requires the Secretary-General of the U.N. to keep the Contracting States posted on
action taken by other States under various articles of the Convention. Article XVI deals
with the authentic texts and certified copies of the Convention.
108. U.S. DEL. REP. 22:
In the light of the foregoing analysis of the convention, the Delegation recommends
strongly that the United States not sign or adhere to the convention. In its view
there are compelling legal and policy objections to such adherence, whether it be
done without reservation, with reliance on the "federal state clause" or with a reser-
vation specially adjusted to the requirements of the United States federal system.
The reasons for the Delegation's negative recommendation were summarized as follows:
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The issue of United States accession to the convention should be re-examined '
9
and decided on the basis of a realistic appraisal of the benefits to be gained by
accession 110 and the difficulty of the problems presented by the United States
federal system.
Benefits
As to those countries which presently refuse to recognize or enforce United
States awards,"' accession to the Convention by the United States would re-
quire such a country, if also a Contracting State, to recognize such awards
as "binding" and to enforce them. In those countries where arbitral awards
are recognized but given only a limited effect,"12 the Convention would seem
to require such States to grant United States and other foreign awards a more
"binding" effect. In many States where United States awards are now en-
forceable," 3 they are ineligible for the summary procedure of enforcement
which that State gives to foreign awards covered by the Geneva Convention." 4
a
1. The convention, if accepted on a basis that avoids conflict with State laws
and judicial procedures, will confer no meaningful advantages on the United States.
2. The convention, if accepted on a basis that assures such advantage, will over-
ride the arbitration laws of a substantial number of States and entail changes in
State and possibly Federal court procedures.
3. The United States lacks a sufficient domestic legal basis for acceptance of
an advanced international convention on this subject matter.
4. The convention embodies principles of arbitration law which it would not be
desirable for the United States to endorse.
Id. at 2.
109. The House of Delegates of the American Bar Association adopted the follow-
ing resolution on September 1, 1960:
RESOLVED that the American Bar Association recommend to the President and
the Congress that the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards be ratified by the United States....
See generally ABA INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW SECTION, REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW (1960).
110. For a consideration of the benefits to be obtained by accession, see ABA INTER-
NATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW SECTION, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW (1959), and in particular the annexed letter of Arthur H.
Dean. Id. at C-3. Cf. Correspondence with American Businessmen, collected by the U.S.
Council of the International Chamber of Commerce for Presentation to the State Depart-
ment (Sept. 1959); Haight, American Foreign Trade and Investment Disputes, 14 ARB.
J. (n.s.) 73, 81-82 (1959).
111. Cf. ABA INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW SECTION, REPORT, op. cit. supra
note 109, at 11-12.
112. See Buyitch, Treaty Law of Private Arbitration, 10 An. J. (n.s.) 188, 193
(1955).
113. E.g., West Germany enforces United States awards. See UN EcoNoMIc Com-
MISSION FOR EUROPE, TABLE OF BILATERAL CONVENTIONS RELATING TO THE ENFORCEMENT
OF ARBITRAL AWARDS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION PROCEDURE
18 (1957).
114. For example, the British Arbitration Act, discussed above, equates awards covered
by the Geneva Convention with domestic judgments.
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The anticipated extension of such procedure to awards covered by the U.N.
Convention would expedite the enforcement of United States awards in that
State. Even with regard to those countries where United States awards are
presently enforced, membership in the Convention would standardize the en-
forcement procedure. United States businessmen going abroad to enforce
awards would know what to expect in each of the Contracting States. Member-
ship of the United States in a multilateral arbitral convention would also
give United States businessmen much more flexibility in planning their foreign
transactions. Instead of attempting to tie the settlement of disputes to the
favorable law of one country, the drafters of international agreements could
provide for much greater play in the selection of the place of settlement of
disputes, confident of enforcement in all the Contracting States.
Problems
Federalism-Enforcement in the State Courts
The law of the vast majority of the states of the United States renders
"future disputes" arbitration agreements revocable and unenforceable."15 In
a proceeding to enforce an arbitral award based on such an agreement, the
court will void the award if the defendant proves he revoked his promise to
arbitrate before the award was rendered. Would the Convention require these
state laws to be changed, so that foreign awards based on such agreements and
covered by the Convention would have to be enforced by the state courts?
The words themselves would not seem to require this. Article V speaks of
enforcement of the award by "the competent authority" of a Contracting
State. Presumably, a special administrative agency for the enforcement of
awards under the Convention could satisfy this Article, and certainly the
federal courts would. The Convention does not require that awards be enforce-
able in every court of general jurisdiction in the land.
Greater difficulties may be raised by Article II, which requires "the court"
of a Contracting State to stay litigation instituted in contravention of the
arbitral agreement. If "the court" were interpreted to mean only those courts
designated as the "competent authority" (for example, the federal courts),
enforcement of the Convention would be weakened to the extent that litigation
in violation of its commands could be instituted in state courts. More effective
enforcement might be obtained by construing the word "court" to mean every
court, state or federal, where litigation involving an arbitrable dispute is
instituted. Under this interpretation, no court would be able to proceed with
litigation in defiance of an arbitration provision subject to the Convention.ll5a
115. See 3 Am. JUR. ARBITRATixON & AwAID § 59 (1936).
115a. The scope of federal authority to govern the administration of state courts is un-
clear. The Federal Employers Liability Act does not expressly require state courts to give
a remedy, but the Supreme Court has held that a state court may not close its doors to
FELA cases if it affords a remedy for common law negligence actions. McKnett v. St.
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But this same result could also be reached without requiring state courts to
take affirmative action if defendants desiring to stay the state proceedings
were able to remove to a federal court empowered to stay the conflicting litiga-
tion.
The Federal Arbitration Act as a Basis for Accession.
The sole fount of federal power on which the Congress relied in enacting
the Federal Arbitration Act was the Commerce Clause. Therefore this Act
would satisfy the Convention's requirements only as to foreign awards involv-
ing commerce. Unless the United States limits its accession to commercial
matters, a large number of foreign awards covered by the Convention would
be unenforceable under the Act. Further, the Federal Arbitration Act does not
apply to employment contracts, regardless of the amount of foreign commerce
involved; the arbitration clauses in such contracts would be the basis for a
large number of awards by the Convention but excluded by the Act. The Act is
generally thought not to be a basis for original jurisdiction in the federal
courts."16 Even the Lawrence case admitted this limitation."17 If original
jurisdiction is held not available, the proponent of a foreign arbitral award
could invoke the Federal Arbitration Act only if his award satisfied the $10,000
Louis & S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230, 234 (1934) ("A state may not discriminate against rights
arising under federal law."). While the Court did hold that the state court was not obliged
to give a FELA case the same type of jury that a federal tribunal would, Minneapolis &
St. L. R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916), that case has been qualified by holding that
the state must give the plaintiff his "federal right" to have the issue of fraud tried by a
jury, Dice v. Akron, C. & Y.R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952), and to have his pleadings con-
strued leniently. Brown v. Western Ry., 338 U.S. 294 (1949). But these cases do not sup-
port the proposition that state courts may be forced to give a remedy they presently refuse
to give.
See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (state may not refuse to enforce a valid federal
penal law). Compare McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49
Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1957) (Congress may not compel a
state court, in enforcing federal rights, to withhold a remedy usually available in the state
court).
The Supreme Court has held that a state must afford a remedy for violation of the
federal Constitution. Ward v. Comm'rs, 253 U.S. 17 (1920); Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bk.
v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239 (1931) ; General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908). And the
Court recently has upset the doctrine that arbitration is not substantive but merely a pro-
cedural remedy. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956). These cases and the
Supremacy Clause would presumably be the basis for an argument that the state courts may
be utilized for the enforcement of a federal arbitral policy with regard to foreign arbitral
awards.
See generally, Note, 73 Hagv. L. Rv. 1551 (1960) ; HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEu 391-99, 470-77, 795 (1953).
116. The federal courts have no jurisdiction of motions to stay arbitration, absent some
other basis of jurisdiction. Application of Rosenthal-Block China Corp., 183 F. Supp. 659
(S.D.N.Y. 1960); in re Arbitration between Local 91, ILGWU and Frankow Mfg. Co.,
183 F. Supp. 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
117. Robert Lawrence Co. v. Deveonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 408 (2d Cir.
1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 909, writ of cert. dimnissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960).
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jurisdictional amount and involved diversity of citizenship or some basis of
federal subject matter jurisdiction.11 Because many claimants can probably
satisfy these requirements, 119 the number of foreign awards that would be
excluded under these provisions may be relatively small, but every one would
be in direct violation of the obligation of a Contracting State under the Con-
vention. And if the Act does not create original jurisdiction, removal of state
court litigation instituted in contravention of an arbitral agreement would not
always be available.
It might be argued that, despite Judge Medina's dictum in Lawrence, the
"federal right" recognized by that opinion can itself serve as a basis for federal
question jurisdiction. 2° Judge Medina's dictum that the Act cannot be the
basis of section 1331 jurisdiction was based on the provision in section 4 that
the party seeking to invoke the statutory procedure must petition a court
which would otherwise have had jurisdiction. Since there is no similar restric-
tion over the plenary action covered by section 2 of the Federal Arbitration
Act, it would seem that a party's rights under section 2 would constitute
federal question jurisdiction. And if the section 4 requirement were construed
as a venue limitation rather than as a jurisdictional limitation, the Federal
Arbitration Act could be interpreted to grant federal question jurisdiction
even over the statutory proceeding.
But even if this new interpretation of the Act were accepted, other factors
would still render the statute unsuitable as a basis for accession to the Con-
vention. Since the Act provides only for a stay of federal court 121 litigation,
defendants in state court litigation would be unable to invoke the Act for a
stay even if they could remove. Finally, the Act contains no provision for
confirming foreign arbitral awards. Section 9 allows confirmation in the court
specified by the parties in their agreement. If no such provision is contained
in the agreement, then application may be made to the United States court in
and for the district within which such award was made.122 A foreign award
would not come literally within these words. While the section might have
been read as not denying jurisdiction in any other federal court, the practice
118. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-60 (1958). See generally MOORE, CO2IIMENTARY ON THE
UNITED STATES JUDICIAL CODE f11 0.03(22)-0.03(27) (1949).
119. By virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2), there is diversity of citizenship between
citizens of a state and citizens or subjects of foreign countries.
120. This view is raised and discussed in Note, 69 YALE L.J. 847 (1960).
121. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1958):
If aiy suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon
any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration
the court in which such suit is pending upon being satisfied that the issue involved
in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall
on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration
has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant
for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration. (Emphasis added.)
122. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1958).
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with respect to foreign awards has been to institute a common law contract
action on the award, alleging the jurisdictional amount and diversity or some
other basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction.
123 The continuation of
such procedure under the Convention would violate both Article II and
Article III.
Going Beyond the Federal Arbitration Act
The Self-Executing Convention
Creating an international obligation of the country is one thing; effectuating
that obligation as municipal law is quite another. One method that has been
tried is a declaration by the United States, in ratifying a treaty, that the treaty
is self-executing and shall become, without further action, the domestic law
of the United States. A typical example is that of treaties protecting the
right of aliens to acquire or inherit property in the United States. 24
The advantage of following this route with the U.N. Convention would be
that the provisions of the Convention, in haec verba, would become the
domestic law of the United States. The Convention would automatically grant
federal question jurisdiction.125 Since the Convention does not seem to require
all the courts in a nation to enforce the award, enactment as a self-executing
treaty could be construed as requiring only federal courts to enforce the award.
Arid, as suggested above, the stay provisions of the Convention could be met
through the use of the removal power. The provisions would apply to all
awards defined by the Convention, and the local procedure to be applied to
such awards would be that spelled out in the Articles of the Convention.
Supplementary Legislation
A less controversial 123 method for obtaining domestic enforcement of the
Convention would be to enact supplementary legislation. Such legislation could
be based not only on the Commerce Clause but also on the foreign affairs
123. E.g., Standard Magnesium Corp. v. Otto Fuchs, 251 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1957).
124. E.g., Treaty with France (1778), upheld in Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat)
259 (1817).
125. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1958):
... Arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.
See International Refugee Organization v. Republic S.S. Corp., 189 F.2d 858, 861 (4th Cir.
1951) (dictum).
126. An attempt to adopt a self executing treaty will probably raise both political and
legal problems. There have been numerous attempts to amend the Constitution to limit the
treaty power. One such attempt failed to pass the Senate by one vote. S.J. Res. 1, 83d
Cong., 1st Sess.; 100 CONG. REc. 2374-75 (1954). The "Bricker Amendment" to restrict
the treaty power was again introduced on Feb. 24, 1961, as S.J. Res. 55, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1961).
The legal problems are also unsettled. For a recent decision holding invalid an attempt
by Congress to enact domestic federal law by use of a treaty reservation, see Power Au-
thority v. FPC, 247 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir.), vacated as moot, 355 U.S. 64 (1957) ; 51 Am.
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power of Congress.12 7 It should explicitly establish the enforcement of arbitral
agreements and awards covered by the Convention as a special basis of original
federal jurisdiction in the District Courts. 28 In view of the requirement that
federal question jurisdiction be based on the creation of federal rights,
2 9
presumably Congress would have to provide that the validity of arbitration
agreements under the Convention be governed by federal substantive law. 130
This would require legislative enactment of the position taken by Judge
Medina in Lawrence.
The coverage of this supplementary legislation should be as broad as the
Convention itself. The exclusion of employment contracts involving foreign
commerce should be eliminated.: 3 With regard to those arbitral agreements
and awards to which the new legislation would apply, its provisions must
match the Convention's requirements. The arbitral agreement must be
"recognized." While the Convention does not expressly require specific per-
formance of the agreement by court order, this has been available under the
Federal Arbitration Act 132 and there is no reason to cut back under the
Convention. Judicial proceedings instigated in defiance of an arbitral agree-
ment must be stayed at the instance of the defendant. A stay must be avail-
able not only for litigation instituted in the federal courts-as it is now under
the Federal Arbitration Act-but also for state court litigation removed to the
J. IN'T L. 797 (1957). For conflicting views on the scope of the treaty power with respect
to the enactment of domestic law, compare Looper, Limitations on the Treaty Power in
Federal States, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1045 (1959), with Henkin, Treaty Makers and the Law
Makers; the Law of the Land and Foreign Relations, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 903 (1959).
127. There appears no real need for the United States to limit its accession to com-
mercial matters as provided in Article 1(3). Awards on political matters and other subjects
which the United States finds repugnant to its public policy can be adequately handled
under that heading.
128. A special jurisdictional provision would be required to avoid the $10,000 juris-
dictional amount required by the basic federal question jurisdictional provision, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1337 (1958). Even without such a special provision, it is arguable that the jurisdictional
amount could be avoided by reliance upon 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1958), which grants federal
jurisdiction of civil actions arising under "any Act of Congress regulating commerce."
129. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1958). See Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
130. This is the course suggested by the Supreme Court's decision in Textile Workers
v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), involving a similar attempt to confer federal juris-
diction under § 301 of Taft-Hartley, 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958).
For the view that a "protective jurisdiction" to apply state law does not exceed Article
III, see Teamsters Union v. Mead, 230 F.2d 576 (Ist Cir. 1956); Textile Workers v.
Lincoln Mills, supra, at 459-60 (concurring opinion); HART & WECESLER, T3E FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEm 744-47 (1953). But cf. Textile Workers v. American
Thread Co., 113 F. Supp. 137 (D Mass. 1953) ; Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, Vipra,
at 469-84 (dissenting opinion).
131. Quaere whether the "commercial" reservation may be used to exclude labor mat-
ters. Such matters are within the "Commerce Clause" of the United States Constitution,
but are not within the "commercial" codes of some civil law countries.
132. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1958).
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federal courts.13 3 The foreign arbitral award must be recognized and enforced
according to the conditions laid down in the Convention. Confirmation of the
award in the federal courts must be made available.
The procedure for enforcement need not be identical with that applicable
to interstate awards under the Federal Arbitration Act-a certain amount of
time spent in ascertaining whether the Convention applies will be an unavoid-
able discrimination. But once the court has assured itself that the Convention
does apply, there should be no reason for treating the award any differently
from interstate awards. All the normal controls on the arbitral process are
contained in Article V.
Ideally, perhaps, there should be a full-scale revision of the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act to make it conform to the internationally accepted procedures set forth
in the Convention. There is no immediate reason for having arbitral pro-
visions for interstate awards with less scope or less modern procedures than
those for foreign awards. But this is not essential to the carrying out of
United States obligations under the Convention. All that is required is a
specific amendment to the Federal Arbitration Act, extending to all arbitral
agreements and awards covered by the Convention the benefit of the Act's
provisions with regard to stays of litigation, enforcement of the arbitral agree-
ment, and confirmation of the award. The latter two remedies would have to
be available in any federal court with personal jurisdiction of the parties.
Limiting Accession to the Federal Courts-The Problem of Reciprocity.
The United Sates should explicity limit accession to the federal courts, in
the sense that those courts will be the only tribunals in which the obligations
of the United States under the Convention may be enforced. It is neither
necessary nor desirable to make a formal reservation to this effect, in view
of the Resolution of the Conference forbidding any additional reservations.
The best technique would be to issue a declaration simultaneously with acces-
sion, defining the competent authority for enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards to be the federal courts of the United States. Article II's requirements
for a stay of conflicting litigation could be handled internally, by making
actions involving matters arbitrable under the Convention a basis for original
jurisdiction in the federal courts.
Limited accession, however, presents a problem of reciprocity, under Article
XIV. In the courts of a majority of the states of the United States, foreign
arbitral agreements will not be recognized, stays of conflicting litigation will
not be granted, and a foreign arbitral award will still be unenforceable if the
agreement was revoked prior to the handing down of the award. Of course, the
133. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1958). "A court of the United States may not grant an
injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of
Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judg-
ments." For a review of cases involving federal court injunctions of state court proceed-
ings, see HART & WEcHSLiR, op. cit. supra note 130, at 1057-78.
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existence of such state doctrines would not detract from the actual enforce-
ment of the Convention by the United States, because any award or agreement
subject to the Convention could be enforced in a federal court applying
federal law. Nevertheless, it is possible that contracting states might invoke
Article XIV to deny the benefits of the Convention to arbitral agreements
governed by the law of those states and awards rendered in the territory or
under the laws of such states. 134 But even this possibility is unlikely. The
suggested federal legislation would satisfy the requirements of the Convention
in the only relevant aspect by guaranteeing enforcement of those awards
which are covered by the Convention.
On the practical level, it is exceedingly doubtful that countries which have
espoused the cause of international arbitration to the extent of acceding to the
Convention would demand a fundamental alteration in the United States
federal system as a condition of reciprocal enforcement. On the other hand,
it is to be expected that the courts of such countries will require some proof
that the United States awards presented for enforcement do come within the
coverage of the Convention. If the United States does not limit its accession to
commercial matters, then it would be an easy matter for the other country
to determine if the award is "foreign." But if the United States, pursuant to
Article 1 (3), limits its accession to matters "considered as commercial" under
United States law, the determination of reciprocity may become particularly
difficult for the courts of the enforcing Contracting State, unless some guide
to the meaning of "commercial" under United States law is adopted con-
currently. The enforcing Contracting State is free to prescribe the procedure
for determining if the award tendered is entitled to the benefits of the Con-
vention, subject always to the prohibition in Article III of substantially more
onerous conditions than are imposed upon the enforcement of domestic awards.
134. The U.S. Delegation held this view (although it is not clear whether this view
would have been advanced if the Delegation were contemplating the enforcement scheme
suggested above). U.S. DEL. RFP., at 22:
Conversely, other countries would be entitled to deny enforcement to United States
awards if rendered under the laws of any of the States. This automatically limits
the benefits of the convention to the relatively small number of awards rendered
under the Federal Arbitration Act.
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